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LOUISIANA LA W REVIEW
Kaplan: CONTINUING PROBLEMS WITH THE CONSTANT
ACKNOWLEDGMENT RULE
A corporation pledged a collateral mortgage note to a bank to
secure a loan financing development of the mortgaged property. To
secure further the collateral mortgage note, the corporation also
pledged several contracts to sell lots on the property. For eighteen
months the corporation paid only interest on the loan. Eventually
the bank sold both the hand note that represented the loan and the
accompanying security devices. The land was sold several times, the
purchaser assuming the mortgage each time. Eleven years after the
execution of the loan, the holder of the hand note filed suit against
the corporation and subsequent purchasers of the property to collect
on the note and to enforce the collateral mortgage. The court of ap-
peal affirmed the trial court's judgment' in favor of the holder,
ordering enforcement of the collateral mortgage. On original hearing
the Louisiana Supreme Court, reversing in part, held that the pledg-
ed contracts did not interrupt prescription on the collateral mort-
gage note because the parties to the contracts revoked them. The
court concluded that the prescribed collateral mortgage note, how-
ever, interrupted prescription on the hand note because the col-
lateral note remained in the possession of the creditor and served as
a constant acknowledgment of the debt.' Kaplan v. University Lake
Corp., 381 So. 2d 385 (La. 1980).
Pledge is a contract by which a debtor gives his property to a
creditor as security;' as an accessory obligation, pledge exists only if
a primary obligation or debt is present.' A distinguishing feature of
the contract of pledge is that the pledged property actually must be
placed in the possession of the creditor or his agent.' Furthermore,
the creditor has the right to retain the pledge until the entire debt
1. Kaplan v. University Lake Corp., 369 So. 2d 1107 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
2. On rehearing the court amended its ruling and held that, upon prescription of
the collateral mortgage note, the collateral mortgage became unenforceable and the
hand note reverted to a purely personal obligation of its maker. Kaplan v. University
Lake Corp., 381 So. 2d 385, 389-91 (La. 1980). The decision on rehearing will not be
discussed except insofar as it relates to the constant acknowlegement rule.
3. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3133: "The pledge is a contract by which one debtor gives
something to his creditor as a security for his debt."
4. LA. Civ. CODE arts. 3136-38.
5. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3152: "It is essential to the contract of pledge that the
creditor be put in possession of the thing given to him in pledge, and consequently
that actual delivery of it be made to him, unless he has possession of it already by
some other right." For the requirements of the delivery of incorporeal rights, see LA.
CIV. CODE arts. 3153 & 3158.
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is paid.' Because the debtor is divested of his property and cannot
reclaim it until he has extinguished the debt, the debtor has con-
siderable incentive to pay the creditor.
Since 1842 Louisiana courts have held that prescription does not
run against a debt secured by a pledge.' The theory underlying this
principle is thgt the creditor's possession of the pledge with the con-
sent of the pledgor operates as a constant acknowledgment of the
debt which continually interrupts prescription.!
The requirement that the debtor be dispossessed of the pledged
property is of primary importance to the constant acknowledgment
rule. Prescription ceases to run whenever the debtor acknowledges
the right of the creditor to collect the debt;' thus, an acknowledg-
ment that interrupts prescription may be inferred from any act by
the debtor indicating that he still owes the debt." Because the pur-
pose of the contract of pledge is to secure a debt," the giving of a
pledge to a creditor constitutes positive evidence of acknowledg-
ment of the debt.'2 So long as the debtor allows his valuable prop-
erty to remain in the possession of the creditor as security for the
debt, the debtor continues to acknowledge the creditor's right;
hence, prescription is continuously interrupted on the debt.'3
6. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3164: "The creditor who is in possesion of the pledge can
only be compelled to return it, but when he has received the whole payment of the
principal as well as the interest and costs."
7. Succession of Picard, 238 La. 455, 115 So. 2d 817 (1959); Scott v. Corkern, 231
La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956); Standard Homestead Ass'n v. Horvath, 205 La. 520, 17
So. 2d 811 (1944); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Holloway, 191 La. 583, 186 So. 35 (1938);
Latiolais v. Citizens' Bank of Louisiana, 33 La. Ann. 1444 (1881); Wilson v. Bannen, 1
Rob. 556 (La. 1842).
8. See Police Jury of West Baton Rouge v. Duralde, 22 La. Ann. 107 (1870);
Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. Johnson, 21 La. Ann. 128 (1869); Montgomery v.
Levistones, 8 Rob. 145 (La. 1844).
9. LA. CiV. CODE arts. 3520 & 3551.
10. 28 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & A. TISSIER, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE
DROIT CIVIL, PRESCRIPTION no. 529 (4th ed. 1924) in 5 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 260 (La.
St. L. Inst. trans. 1972).
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133.
12. G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & A. TISSIER, no. 530, supra note 10, at 263. See
Scott's Executors v. Shreveport, 20 F. 714 (W.D. La. 1884).
13. G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & A. TISSIER, supra note 10, at 263: "We would even
say that when a security was given, the creditor's right can not continue to be pre-
scribed as long as the security is in the creditor's hands, since it constitutes a tacit
acknowledgment." Scovel v. Gill, 30 La. Ann. 1207 (1878); Police Jury of West Baton
Rouge v. Duralde, 22 La. Ann. 107 (1870); Citizens' Bank of Louisiana v. Johnson, 21
La. Ann. 128 (1869); Montgomery v. Levistones, 8 Rob. 145 (La. 1844); Wilson v. Ban-
nen, 1 Rob. 556 (La. 1842). See 2 M. PLAINOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE pt. 2, no. 2462 (11th
ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
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In Wilson v. Bannen,'4 the earliest decision mentioning the con-
stant acknowledgment doctrine in Louisiana, a ship owner sought to
retain possession of a shipper's property and recognition of a priv-
ilege on the property to satisfy unpaid shipping charges. The ship-
per's other creditors contended that the owner's claim had pre-
scribed and that the owner had no right to retain the goods. The
Louisiana Supreme Court upheld the ship owner's rights of reten-
tion and preference, holding that an implied constant acknowledg-
ment of the debt by the shipper resulted from the owner's posses-
sion of the shipper's goods as security for the debt. 5 Because the
shipper's acknowledgment served as an interruption, prescription
did not run on the primary debt."6 The court's use of the constant
acknowledgment rule in Wilson was consistent with the principles of
pledge; ie., the creditor could retain the pledged property until pay-
ment extinguished the debt. 7
Meyer Bros. v. Colvin8 created an entirely new aspect of the
constant acknowledgment rule. The court held that the creditor's de-
tention of a pledged note (which prescribed after it had been pledged)
interrupted prescription on the principal obligation. 9 The court
reasoned that the detention of the pledge by the creditor, not the
act of pledge, interrupted prescription. Because the pledged note,
although prescribed, was not lost or destroyed but remained in the
possession of the creditor, prescription was interrupted." This
holding detached the constant acknowledgment rule from its ra-
tionale. The rule's premise is that the debtor wants to regain posses-
sion of the pledged property and allows the creditor to hold the
pledge only as security for the debt.' In Meyer Bros. the prescribed
note no longer had value and could not function as security. Addi-
tionally, as the pledged note was worthless, the debtor had no rea-
son to desire its return; thus, any basis for inferring an acknowledg-
ment disappeared when the pledged note prescribed.22
The decision of Scott v. Corkern23 represented a further depar-
ture from the rationale of the constant acknowledgment rule. In
Scott the pledge of a life insurance policy secured a promissory
14. 1 Rob. 556 (La. 1842).
15., Id. at 558.
16. Id.
17. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3133, 3152, 3157, & 3164.
18. 122 La. 153, 47 So. 447 (1908).
19. 122 La. at 154, 47 So. at 448.
20. Id.
21. See text at note 8, supra.
22. See text at notes 11-13, supra.
23. 231 La. 368. 91 So. 2d 569 (1956).
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note." The creditor waited thirty years to sue on the promissory
note. Although the debtor mysteriously regained possession of the
policy during this period, the court ruled that the pledge still ex-
isted because the debtor held the policy as the creditor's agent.25
Because the pledge was found to be extant, the court applied the
constant acknowledgment rule and held that prescription had been
interrupted on the promissory note. 6
The court's application of the constant acknowledgment rule in
Scott was inconsistent both with the rationale of the rule and with
the nature of pledge.27 The constant acknowledgement rule empha-
sizes possession of the pledge by the creditor or his agent only
because such possession indicates that the debtor, in recognition of
the creditor's right, allows the creditor to hold his property." The
dispossession of the debtor is also a primary advantage of the
pledge as a security device. In effect, the court's ruling in Scott
meant that the debtor's possession of his own pledge was an ac-
knowledgment of the creditor's right.29
Succession of Picard" further extended the constant acknow-
ledgment rule by holding that a pledge of a promissory note, pre-
scribed on its face at the time of the pledge, interrupted prescrip-
24. 231 La. at 374-75, 91 So. 2d at 571. The initial issue before the court was
whether the insurance policy was transferred as a pledge or as an assignment. The in-
surance policy had been changed to make the transferee the beneficiary; however, the
question also existed as to whether the transferee also became the owner of the policy.
The delivery of an assignment involves a transfer of ownership. LA. CIv. CODE art.
2642. The delivery of a pledge transfers only possession of the pledged property. LA.
CIv. CODE arts. 3166 & 3175. The court found that the contract between the parties
evidenced an intent to treat the policy as a pledge; therefore, transfer of the owner-
ship of the policy did not occur. 231 La. at 374-75, 91 So. 2d at 571.
25. The court indicated:
The mere circumstance that the pledged insurance policy was found in the posses-
sion of the pledgor does not justify the conclusion that the pledge was extinguished
and, in the absence of any evidence showing that the pledge be terminated or
even that the pledgor considered it terminated, it will be presumed that the
possession of the pledgor was precarious or as an agent pro hac vice.
231 La. at 378, 91 So. 2d at 572.
26. 231 La. at 380-81, 91 So. 2d at 573.
27. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1956-1957 Term--
Security Devices, 18 LA. L. REV. 10, 49-51 (1957).
28. See text at notes 5-6, supra.
29. The Louisiana Legislature has enacted legislation specifically allowing the
pledgor to remain in possession of pledged incorporeal rights under certain limited cir-
cumstances. See LA. R.S. 9:4302-03, 4321-23 & 4324 (1950 & Supp. 1978).
30. 238 La. 455, 115 So. 2d 817 (1959). See Comment, Pledge, Prescription, and the
Succession of Picard, 10 Loy. L. REV. 82 (1959); Note, Limitation of Action-Interrup-




tion on the principal debt." The court abandoned any attempt to
base the rationale of the constant acknowledgment rule on the deb-
tor's consent to the creditor's possession of valuable property. The
court instead asserted that the mere detention of the pledge serves
as a constant acknowledgment of the debt and as an interruption of
prescription; "tilt is not the detention of a thing of value by the
pledgee which serves as a constant acknowledgment .... 32
In the instant case, Kaplan v. University Lake Corporation,33 the
Louisiana Supreme Court once again had the opportunity to ex-
amine the rationale of the constant acknowledgment doctrine. The
issue on original hearing was whether or not prescription had run
against either a hand note or a collateral mortgage note. The hand
note was secured by the pledge of the collateral mortgage note
which, in turn, was secured by a pledge of buy-sell contracts.34 The
court found that the pledged contracts were revoked by the mutual
consent of the parties to the contract with the approval of the
creditor; therefore, the contracts were no longer in the possession of
the creditor, and prescription was not interrupted on the collateral
mortgage note. 5 The court reasoned that the possession of the ac-
tual obligation, not the detention of written evidence of the obliga-
tion, interrupts prescription; because the contracts were revoked,
the obligation evidenced by them no longer existed." Because more
than five years 7 had passed without acknowledgment by the maker
or action by the creditor, the collateral mortgage note was prescrib-
ed, and the collateral mortgage was unenforceable.38
31. 238 La. at 462-63, 115 So. 2d at 819-20.
32. Id. (emphasis in original).
33. 381 So. 2d 385 (La. 1980).
34. Id. at 386-87.
35. Id. at 389.
36. 381 So. 2d at 387-88. Actually, the court was explaining the rationale of the
decision in Succession of Picard, 238 La. 455, 115 So. 2d 817 (1959), but the court ap-
parently relied on the same reasoning in the instant case.
37. Civil Code article 3520 provides for a five-year period for liberative prescrip-
tion on promissory notes.
38. Apart from its treatment of the constant acknowledgment rule, the court
erred in holding that the collateral mortgage note had prescribed. The court stated
that prescription against the collateral mortgage note began on November 3, 1964, the
day the pledged contracts were revoked. The suit was not filed until November 15,
1974; therefore, more than five years had elapsed, and the collateral mortgage note
prescribed. 381 So. 2d at -389. However, the court overlooked the salient fact that the
corporation continued to pay interest on the hand note until April, 6, 1966. Id. at 387
n.2. Louisiana Revised Statutes 9:5807 provides that a payment on the principal obliga-
tion constitutes an acknowledgment of the debt on all other obligations that are pledg-
ed to secure the principal obligation on which payment is being made. According to
this statute, prescription did not begin to run until April 6, 1966, when the last in-
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In ruling on the hand note, however, the court reaffirmed the
constant acknowledgment rule39 and held that a pledged collateral
mortgage note, even if it prescribes, always interrupts prescription
on the hand note.'" The importance of Kaplan derives partially from
the reaffirmation of the constant acknowledgment rule and partially
from the innovative rationale that the court fashioned for this
holding. The court ruled that if a promissory note prescribes, the
terest payment was made, and prescription could not have tolled until April 6, 1971.
The court failed to consider that an assumption of the collateral mortgage by each
subsequent purchaser of the property also constituted an acknowledgment of the col-
lateral mortgage note, interrupting prescription on the note. In Simon v. McMeel, 167
La. 243, 119 So. 35 (1928), the Louisiana Supreme Court held that prescription on a
promissory note secured by a mortgage was interrupted or suspended when a pur-
chaser of the mortgaged property assumed payment of the mortgage. In Kaplan, the
mortgaged property changed hands as follows: (1) November 10, 1964-sale of 60% of
the property by University Lake Corporation to Ingram Contractors, Inc., Parish of
East Baton Rouge Conveyance Records book 1806, folio 99; (2) December 7, 1967-sale
of 40% of the property by University Lake Corporation to Town House Trace, Inc.,
Parish of East Baton Rouge Conveyance Records, book 1995, folio 206; (3) December
26, 1969-sale of 60% of property by Ingram Contractors, Inc. to Town House Trace,
Inc., Parish of East Baton Rouge Conveyance Records, book 2102, folio 143; (4)
December 29, 1970-sale of property by Town House Trace, Inc. to International
Speedways, Inc. with assumption of all mortgages extant against the property, Parish
of East Baton Rouge Conveyance Records, book 2148, folio 102; (5) June 15, 1971-sale
by International Speedways, Inc. to Guaranty Savings Assurance Company with
assumption of all mortgages extant against the property, Parish of East Baton Rouge
Conveyance Records, book 2199, folio 203.
On the date International Speedways assumed the mortgage, December 29, 1970,
the collateral mortgage note had not yet prescribed; therefore, on this date prescrip-
tion was interrupted on the collateral mortgage note. As interruption caused the
prescriptive period to begin anew, LA. CIv. CODE arts. 3520 & 3551, the collateral note
could not prescribe until December 29, 1975. The final purchaser bought the land and
assumed the mortgage within this five-year period; thus, the collateral mortgage note
had not yet prescribed, and the final purchaser did assume the collateral mortgage.
The court should have affirmed the decisions of the lower courts and ordered enforce-
ment of the collateral mortgage to pay the debt remaining on the hand note.
39. The court cited Succession of Picard, 238 La. 455, 115 So. 2d 817 (1959), and
Scott v. Corkern, 231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956), as authority for the constant
acknowledgment rule. In a note to the decision, the court also acknowledged that the
"policy underlying the doctrine is to protect 'the valuable right of the pledgee to retain
possession of the thing pledged until he [is] paid.'" 381 So. 2d at 387, n.3, quoting Com-
ment, supra note 30, at 88. However, the court continued, "as it has developed in Loui-
siana, the constant acknowledgment rule has come to mean that when there is a
pledge, the principal obligation is imprescriptible, no matter what the value or nature
of the thing pledged." Id.
40. The court stated that "[allthough the collateral mortgage note is prescribed
and the mortgage is unenforceable, the hand note and the original obligation ... have
legal validity. The court of appeal correctly held that the collateral mortgage note,
because the pledgee and his assigns retained it, operated as a constant interruption of
prescription on the hand note." 381 So. 2d at 389.
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
obligation to pay is not extinguished, but subsists as a natural
obligation.4' Because the detention of the pledged obligation, rather
than its value, interrupts prescription, the creditor's detention of a
prescribed mortgage note, representing a natural obligation, is a
constant acknowledgment of the principal debt and continually inter-
rupts prescription.42
The decision in Kaplan, though consistent with prior
jurisprudence, 43 has a questionable effect on the basic principles of
the law of pledge. The fundamental purpose of the pledge is to serve
as security;44 to achieve this purpose, the pledged property must
have value. However, in its treatment of the constant acknowledg-
ment rule, the court ignored the purpose of the pledge contract
4
and instead focused attention on the detention or possession as an
aspect of acknowledgment. The court concluded that the revoked
buy-sell contracts did not interrupt prescription (although the
pledgee retained possession of the contracts) because the obligation
represented by the contracts no longer existed. 46 However, the
detention of the prescribed collateral mortgage note interrupted
prescription on the hand note because the collateral note continued
to exist as a natural obligation.47
Kaplan's distinction between the detention of the written
evidence of an obligation and the detention of a natural obligation is
difficult to understand, at least in light of the nature of pledge as
security. The prescribed collateral mortgage note had no more value
as security for the debt than the worthless evidence of the revoked
contracts; representing merely a natural obligation, the collateral
note was legally unenforceable and, if sold, could bring no funds to
apply to the debt. The invocation of the constant acknowledgment
rule in this situation served only to allow the interruption of
prescription, not to preserve the essential security function of
pledge.
The court's holding that the creditor's detention of a natural
obligation activates the constant acknowledgment rule also con-
tradicts the principles underlying prescription and acknowledgment.
Prescription should run against a debt if the creditor is inactive
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See Succession of Picard, 238 La. 455, 115 So. 2d 817 (1959); Scott v. Corkern,
231 La. 368, 91 So. 2d 569 (1956); Meyer Bros. v. Colvin, 122 La. 153, 47 So. 447 (1908).
See text at notes 18-22, 27-29, & 30-32, supra.
44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3133.
45. See note 40, supra.




without excuse for a long period of time." If a debtor allows his
creditor to hold valuable property as a pledge, the creditor has an
excuse for not pressing his claim; the creditor knows that the debtor
eventually will pay to get his property back. Thus, the debtor's con-
sent to the creditor's possession of the debtor's valuable property
may be regarded as an acknowledgment of the debt, or, in other
words, as an excuse for the creditor's inaction. 9 Once the pledged
property loses its value, the creditor's excuse for inaction disap-
pears, and the debtor has no reason to seek return of the property.
In that situation, an acknowledgment no longer exists, and prescrip-
tion should begin to run.
The ruling of the court in Kaplan perhaps can be explained as a
policy decision to fashion a "bright-line" test in a troublesome area
of the law. To the extent that future courts follow the Kaplan deci-
sion, this purpose will be achieved; the standard clearly indicated is
that in every case in which a pledge of a promissory note secures a
principal obligation, the principal obligation is imprescriptible ° One
advantage of the Kaplan ruling is that creditors never will have to
worry about prescription's running against a debt when a prom-
issory note is pledged to secure the debt. Additionally, neither
creditors nor the courts will have to inquire into the value of the
pledge to activate the constant acknowledgment rule. 1
But if the court intended to make a "bright-line" test for applica-
tion of the constant acknowledgment rule, the court should have
done so expressly, instead of predicating the rationale of the deci-
sion upon the detention of a natural obligation. The Kaplan decision
risks transforming the contract of pledge from a meaningful security
device into a mechanism to interrupt prescription. As one writer has
suggested, the 'rationale of Kaplan creates the possibility that the
pledge of "a dollar bill or a peppercorn" might be allowed to inter-
rupt prescription on "a million dollar debt." 2
48. G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & A. TISSIER, supra note 10, no. 27, at 17. See LA.
CIv. CODE art. 3459.
49. See cases cited in note 8, supra.
50. 381 So. 2d at 389. See note 40, supra.
51. The effect of the value of the pledged property on the constant acknowledg-
ment rule is a potential problem in cases in which the pledge has greatly decreased in
value and the secured debt has not. In a practical sense, the pledge could be of such
minimal value that the debtor would not want it back; theoretically, no acknowledg-
ment should be inferred at this point. The decision of the court in Kaplan avoids this
difficult problem by stating that the value of the pledge is irrelevant; whether the
pledge remains in the possession of the creditor is the decisive factor. An alternative
to the Kaplan ruling would entail drawing the line between pledges that have no value
and pledges that have some value, even if slight.
52. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1979 Term-Secur-
ity Devices, 40 LA. L. REV. 572, 578 (1980) [hereinafter cited as 1978-1979 Term].
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Other public policies also militate against the court's ruling in
Kaplan. Because the contract of pledge provides the creditor who
possesses pledged property a privilege on the debtor's pledge,53 the
contract conflicts with the general principle that the property of a
debtor is the common pledge of his creditors; 4 therefore, pledge
agreements should be construed strictly and limited to performing
security functions. The policies underlying the theory of prescrip-
tion, including the promotion of security of transactions," discredit
the notion that a debt secured by the pledge of a prescribed promis-
sory note is imprescriptible.5 6 Because general policy favors the in-
stitution of prescription,57 a particular category of debts (obligations
secured by promissory notes) should not be made automatically im-
prescriptible unless sound reasons support special treatment of that
category.58
Whether based on policy considerations or not, the Kaplan deci-
sion is supported by prior jurisprudence 59 and is likely to remain im-
portant in the law of security devices. Accordingly, practitioners
should take note of the two consequences of the decision: (1) obliga-
tions secured by the pledge of a promissory note cannot prescribe,
and (2) promissory notes that serve as pledges may prescribe.
Debtors who contemplate securing their obligations with the
pledge of a promissory note should be counseled that the primary
obligation may be deemed imprescriptible. They should reclaim the
53. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3157: "The pawn invests the creditor with the right of caus-
ing his debt to be satisfied by privilege and in preference to the other creditors of his
debtor, out of the product of the movable, corporeal, or incorporeal, which has been
thus burdened." LA. Civ. CODE art. 3162: "In no case does this privilege subsist on the
pledge, except when the thing pledged . . . has been actually put and remained in the
possession of the creditor ... "
54. LA. CIv. CODE. art. 3183: "The property of the debtor is the common pledge of
his creditors, and the proceeds of its sale must be distributed among them ratably,
unless there exists among the creditors some lawful causes of preference." LA. CIv.
CODE art. 3185: "Privilege can be claimed only for those debts to which it is expressly
granted in this Code."
55. Civil Code article 3133 expressly indicates that the function of pledge is to
serve as security; in contrast the constant acknowledgment rule is a judicial creation.
As pledge is a stricti juris agreement, any possible conflict between the Civil Code
provisions concerning pledge and the constant acknowledgment rule should be resolved
in favor of the Civil Code provisions.
56. G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & A. TISsIER, supra note 10, no. 29, at 18.
57. "[Wlithout it [prescription] there would be no security in transactions, no
stability in private estates, no peace among individuals, no order in the state." Id.
58. Without further explanation, the court in Kaplan offered only the reason that
the detention of a pledge consisting of a natural obligation causes the secured debt to
be imprescriptible. 381 So. 2d at 387-88.
59. See cases cited in note 43, supra.
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pledge promptly when the debt is paid or secure other reliable
evidence of its payment in order to avoid any confusion at a later
date.
The main risk for creditors after Kaplan is that they may find
themselves holding an enforceable principal obligation but no secur-
ity. Creditors -should insert a stipulation in the pledge agreement
that the failure of the debtor to reacknowledge the pledged prom-
issory note within the prescriptive period is a condition of default.
The problems Kaplan poses to the security function of pledge
may be minimized by such precautions; however, a sound approach
to the constant acknowledgment problems would be to decide the
issue of prescription on a case-by-case basis." If a court finds that a
pledge no longer has value, either because the pledge is prescribed
or because it no longer exists, the constant acknowledgment rule
should cease to apply. This approach would insure that the pledge
remains a valuable security device, rather than a tool to interrupt
prescription permanently.
Maureen Anne Noonan
DISCHARGE OF FEDERAL TAX LIENS IN EXECUTORY PROCEEDINGS
The plaintiff bought certain immovable property from a bank
that had, through executory process, sued upon its mortgage and ac-
quired the land at the subsequent sheriff's sale. Inferior federal in-
come tax liens affecting the property were cancelled from the mort-
gage records by the parish clerk of court when the proceeds of the
judicial sale to the bank did not cover the interests of the superior
creditors. The Internal Revenue Service subsequently levied upon
the property, claiming that, since the United States had not received
proper notice of the judicial sale, the liens were still valid; the plain-
tiff sued, alleging that the federal tax liens had been discharged by
the sheriff's sale of the property. The district court held: section
7425(b) of the Internal Revenue Code relating to "other sales," which
requires written notice to the I.R.S., applies to Louisiana's ex-
ecutory process; because proper notice was not given, the judicial
sale did not discharge the federal tax liens. Myers v. United States,
483 F. Supp. 1154 (W.D. La. 1980).'
60. This approach was suggested in 1978-1979 Term, supra note 52, at 578.
1. The scope of this note is limited to the issue of whether or not the tax liens
were discharged by the judicial sale.
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